Is time-based prospective remembering mediated by self-initiated rehearsals Role of incidental cues, ongoing activity, age and motivation by Kvavilashvili, L. & Fisher, L.
                                                                   Time-based Prospective Remembering 1 
Running head: TIME-BASED PROSPECTIVE REMEMBERING 
 
 
Is Time-Based Prospective Remembering Mediated by Self-Initiated Rehearsals? Role of 
Incidental Cues, Ongoing Activity, Age and Motivation 
 
Lia Kvavilashvili 1 and Laura Fisher 2 
 
1 University of Hertfordshire, UK 
 
2  Canterbury Christ Church University College, UK 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Time-based prospective memory, self-initiated vs. automatic retrieval, 
incidental cues, prospective memory and aging, time estimation 
 
Address for correspondence: 
Lia Kvavilashvili 
School of Psychology 
University of Hertfordshire 
College Lane 
Hatfield, Herts, AL10 9AB 
United Kingdom  
Tel. +44 (0) 1707 285121 
Fax +44 (0) 1707 285073  
Email: L.Kvavilashvili@herts.ac.uk 
 
 
                                                                   Time-based Prospective Remembering 2 
Abstract 
The present research examined self-reported rehearsal processes in naturalistic time-
based prospective memory tasks (Study 1 and 2) and compared them to the processes in 
event-based tasks (Study 3). Participants had to (1) remember to phone the experimenter 
either at a pre-arranged time (a time-based task) or after receiving a certain text message 
(an event-based task), and (2) record the details of occasions when they thought about 
this intention during a 7-day delay interval. The rehearsal and retrieval of time-based 
tasks was mediated by more automatic than deliberate self-initiated processes.  Moreover, 
the number of reported rehearsals without any apparent triggers was reliably higher in 
time- than in event-based tasks. Additional findings concern the effects of age, 
motivation and ongoing activities on rehearsal and prospective memory performance. 
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Is Time-Based Prospective Remembering Mediated by Self-Initiated Rehearsals? Role of 
Incidental Cues, Ongoing Activity, Age and Motivation 
Prospective memory is defined as remembering to perform an intended action in 
the future (e.g., making a phone call at 2 p.m. or passing on a message to a colleague) and 
is usually contrasted with retrospective memory that involves remembering information 
from the past (e.g., remembering someone’s name or the contents of a film) (see Graf & 
Uttl, 2001; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000).  A crucial feature of all prospective memory 
tasks is an absence of explicit prompts to instigate the recall. For example, no one tells a 
person that it is now time to make a phone call (i.e., 2 p.m.) or to pass on a message when 
seeing a colleague in the staff room. Instead, people have to realise this for themselves in 
order to carry out an intended action.  
 Einstein and McDaniel (1990; 1996b) have distinguished two broad classes of 
prospective memory tasks: event-based and time-based. In the former one has to 
remember to carry out an intended action in response to a certain target event (e.g., 
posting a letter when seeing a post box), and in the latter to do so at a certain time or after 
a specified time interval (e.g., remembering to make a phone call at 2 p.m. or in twenty 
minutes time). A question of fundamental importance for prospective memory research 
has been about the nature of retrieval in event- and time-based prospective memory. In 
particular, what brings a representation of intention into one’s mind at the right moment 
given that there is no explicit prompt to initiate the retrieval and a person is involved in 
ongoing activities that are unrelated to the to-be-remembered intention?  Is remembering 
intentions mediated entirely by automatic processes at the time of retrieval (i.e., intention 
simply pops into one's mind) or is successful remembering mediated by effortful 
conscious processes such as periodic rehearsal of intention and/or monitoring the 
environment for the appropriate event and/or time? 
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 Substantial progress has been made in answering these questions with respect to 
event-based prospective memory. Remembering of event-based tasks is critically 
dependent on the nature of the target event (e.g., its familiarity, specificity, distinctiveness, 
etc.) as well as the strength of association between the target event and an intended action 
(Guynn, McDaniel, & Einstein, 1998; McDaniel, Guynn, Einstein, & Breneiser, 2004). 
Several theoretical models have been developed and tested that differ in the degree to 
which the remembering is assumed to rely on automatic versus self-initiated retrieval 
processes. For example, a simple activation or automatic associative activation model 
posits that retrieval of intentions occurs automatically in response to target events (see 
Einstein & McDaniel, 1996b; McDaniel, Robinson-Riegler & Einstein, 1998; Nowinski & 
Dismukes, 2005). The familiarity plus search model assumes that initial automatic 
noticing of the target event is followed by a controlled search for the associated action 
(Einstein & McDaniel, 1996b; see also McDaniel et al., 2004), and the 
strategic/attentional monitoring view assumes that successful performance is mediated by 
self-initiated and effortful monitoring of one's environment in search of a target event 
(Burgess & Shallice, 1997; Guynn, 2003; Shallice & Burgess, 1991; Smith, 2003).  Most 
recently, McDaniel and Einstein (2000) proposed a multiprocess account of event-based 
prospective memory which states that, depending on circumstances (i.e., properties of 
target event cues, nature of the task and/or ongoing activity, etc.), prospective memory can 
be mediated by either automatic or strategic processes. Direct empirical evidence in 
support of this new framework comes from several recent experiments conducted by 
McDaniel and Einstein and their colleagues (e.g., McDaniel & Einstein; 2000; Einstein, 
McDaniel, Thomas, Mayfield, Shank, Morrissette, & Breneiser, 2005). 
 Thus, our theoretical understanding of mechanisms underlying the retrieval of 
event-based prospective memory tasks is developing at a rapid pace. It is obvious, 
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however, that the models described above cannot account for the time-based tasks in 
which there is no target event or cue that could be associated with the intended action. 1  
Instead, the retrieval of intention has to be initiated at an appropriate time by a person 
himself/herself. Unfortunately, there are very few empirical studies that have specifically 
examined the nature of retrieval in time-based tasks or processes that lead up to self-
initiated monitoring (e.g., Ceci & Bronfenbrenner, 1985; Cicogna, Nigro, Occhiniero, & 
Ésposito, 2005; Cook, Marsh & Hicks, 2005; Costermans & Desmette, 1999; d'Ydewalle, 
1996; d'Ydewalle, Luwel, & Brunfaut, 1999; Einstein, McDaniel, Richardson, Guynn & 
Cunfer, 1995; Park, Hertzog, Kidder, Morrell, & Mayhorn, 1997; Patton & Meit, 1993; 
Rendell, & Craik, 2000; Sellen, Louie, Harris, & Wilkins, 1997; Wilkins & Baddeley, 
1978). This is surprising given the widespread agreement among researchers that the 
retrieval of time-based tasks is fundamentally different from event-based tasks (Einstein 
& McDaniel, 1996a; 1996b; Sellen et al., 1997), on the one hand, and the prevalence and 
importance of time-based tasks in everyday life, on the other hand. Indeed, successful and 
independent everyday functioning often depends upon timely execution of intentions at 
specific times (e.g., paying bills, keeping appointments, etc.). 
 One interesting finding that has emerged from the few existing laboratory studies 
on time-based prospective memory refers to participants’ time monitoring behaviour 
prior to the critical time to remember. For example, in an early laboratory study by Harris 
and Wilkins (1982), participants had to watch a 2 hour film and remember to carry out a 
simple action at specific times during the viewing (once every 3 or 9 minutes).  In order 
to estimate the elapsed time participants could check a digital clock that was positioned 
behind them. The analysis of participants' clock monitoring behaviour showed that they 
tended to check or rehearse at the beginning of each time interval and particularly during 
the critical period in which they were supposed to act. In other words, they displayed the 
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J-shaped pattern of monitoring.  Moreover, the frequency of rehearsal in a time-based 
task was positively correlated with prospective memory performance (for similar results 
see Einstein et al., 1995; Park et al., 1997). 
 In order to account for their pattern of findings Harris and Wilkins (1982) 
proposed the Test-Wait-Test-Exit (TWTE) model of time-based prospective memory. 
According to this model, people encode the future task and then wait for a period of time 
until a test of memory seems appropriate.  If the time is not correct they continue to wait 
until the critical exit period.  Successful performance is therefore dependent on 
monitoring the time during the critical period. It was also assumed, especially in all 
subsequent studies, that this monitoring was a deliberate self-initiated process requiring 
one's attentional resources (see e.g., Einstein et al., 1995; Park et al., 1997). 
 Although Harris and Wilkins’ (1982) TWTE model of time-based prospective 
memory fits the experimental data and is widely cited, it is largely descriptive as the 
authors acknowledge themselves. Indeed, it does not provide an answer to a basic 
question about "how does one make oneself aware of time, or remind oneself of time-
based intentions, in the absence of cues?  What is the nature of these self-initiated 
processes?" (Sellen et al., 1997, p. 484). One possibility, as pointed out by Harris and 
Wilkins (1982), is that the intention periodically (and spontaneously) pops into one's 
mind. Initial support for this idea comes from a diary study of Ellis and Nimmo-Smith 
(1993) in which participants reported experiencing on average 1.5 spontaneous 
recollections per day (SD=.77, range 0-5) for each of the real-life intentions they 
recorded over a 5-day period.  
An alternative possibility, also suggested by Harris and Wilkins (1982), is that 
intention is actually triggered by some incidental (and subtle) cues in the environment. 
For example, approximately one third of their participants reported that references to time 
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in the film they were watching (e.g., shots of an airport clock, plane departure timetable 
or the mentioning of time in the film script) made them aware of the prospective memory 
task. Similarly, participants in a study of Sellen et al. (1997) reported that seeing or 
hearing things related to the time (i.e., clocks, calendars) often reminded them of their 
prospective memory task to operate an electronic device at four specific times a day.  
 It is interesting that these self-reports seem to support the so called "Random 
Walk" model of prospective remembering proposed by Wilkins (1979; cited in Harris, 
1984) which highlights the importance of incidental external or internal cues in 
remembering intentions. According to Wilkins, our mind can be conceptualised as a 
multidimensional semantic space. When an intention is formed to make a phone call at 2 
p.m. then a certain trace is formed in a particular area of this multidimensional space 
representing this intention. However, our thoughts do not stay in this area throughout the 
delay interval. Instead, "the train of thought" moves through various parts of this space in 
a statistically random manner, depending on the stimuli we encounter in the environment 
and the activities we are engaged in. If, near the time (e.g., 1:30 p.m.), this "train of 
thought" accidentally wanders into an area that is very close to the place representing the 
intention, then it is highly likely that it will result in conscious realisation that a phone 
call should be made. If it is too early the "train of thought" will move away (i.e., we will 
again concentrate on other things) until it again happens to wander close enough to the 
area associated with making the call. 
               This model does not ascribe any active qualities to the representation of 
intention, in other words, it does not regard the retrieval of intention as a self-initiated 
process. Instead, it assumes that the timely remembering of intention is entirely due to 
incidental factors. For example, if nearer the time of intended phone call we come across 
the telephone or somebody mentions the word telephone this will act as a trigger and 
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remind us of our intention. If, however, no such accidental cues are available then the 
intention will not be remembered on time because the "train of thought" will be far away 
from the relevant area in the multidimensional space. 
 The aim of the present study is to test the two models described above (TWTE 
and Random Walk) in order to provide an answer to the question about what brings a 
time-based prospective memory task into one's mind during the retention interval. In 
particular, we wanted to see whether this monitoring or rehearsal is largely a self-initiated 
process, as posited by the TWTE model (occurring during the natural pauses in between 
the activities when a person deliberately thinks about the future upcoming tasks as part of 
everyday planning), or whether this is predominantly occurring in response to incidental 
external (and/or internal) cues as suggested by the Random Walk model. 
 In order to address this question three studies were conducted. In all three studies, 
participants were asked to remember to make a (single) phone call at their chosen time on 
the seventh day from their initial meeting with the experimenter (a time-based 
prospective memory task). In addition, they had to keep a structured diary throughout the 
week and record every instance when they recalled or rehearsed their intention to make 
the phone call. In order to elucidate the nature and origin of these rehearsals participants 
were asked to record a number of variables associated with the cognitive, environmental 
and temporal aspects of each rehearsal.  For example, they had to record what they were 
doing at the time of rehearsal, whether there was any trigger that elicited their memory of 
future intention and if so, what the trigger was. 
 A naturalistic task of making a single phone call was chosen in the present study, 
instead of a laboratory paradigm, for several reasons. Although we were interested in 
prospective memory performance, our primary interest was to examine the rehearsals of 
the task, and therefore we had to choose a simple task that the majority of participants 
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would remember to carry out. Moreover, several researchers have expressed serious 
doubts as to whether current laboratory methods are capable of adequately capturing the 
crucial aspects of time-based prospective remembering as it occurs in everyday life (i.e., 
single, one-off tasks with delay intervals of several hours if not days) (cf. Marsh, Hicks, & 
Landau, 1998). In the laboratory, time-based tasks have to be carried out several times 
during the ongoing activity often with intervals as short as 1 or 2 minutes. Under these 
circumstances it is likely that the prospective memory task never leaves awareness and it is 
not clear whether one studies prospective memory or participant's ability to estimate the 
length of elapsed time (see e.g., Graf & Uttl, 2001; Park et al., 1997; Sellen et al., 1997). 
  The aim of Study 1 was largely exploratory as we wanted to obtain initial 
information on the nature and conditions of monitoring (or rehearsal) in an everyday 
time-based task using a large sample of psychology undergraduates (N=40). The aim of 
Study 2 was to replicate the findings of Study 1 and to extend the study by examining the 
effects of age and motivation on time-based prospective memory rehearsal and 
performance.  The inclusion of these two additional variables in Study 2 was motivated 
by a desire to identify variables that may underlie a paradoxical finding in current 
research on prospective memory and aging: a reliable age effect inside the laboratory 
(particularly in time-based tasks) and no age effect outside the laboratory (Rendell & 
Craik, 2000; Rendell & Thompson, 1999). Finally, by using improved methodology, 
Study 3 further validated the findings obtained on young participants in Study 1 and 2, 
and provided crucial information on underlying mechanisms of time-based prospective 
memory. This was achieved by comparing the nature and distribution of reported 
rehearsals in time- and event-based tasks that were closely matched on important task 
characteristics, including the delay interval and the prospective memory action. In all 
three studies, an underlying assumption was that studying the conditions in which 
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participants report experiencing thoughts about the prospective memory task in the delay 
interval provides important insights about the processes involved in the retrieval of these 
tasks at the designated time (cf. Ellis, & Nimmo-Smith, 1993; Sellen et al., 1997).  
Study 1 
The major aim of Study 1 was to examine if, in everyday life, thoughts about  
time-based tasks are mediated by deliberate and effortful self-initiated processes or 
whether they are triggered by incidental external and/or internal cues. Several related 
issues were also examined. For example, laboratory studies of time-based prospective 
memory have established a positive relationship between the amount of time monitoring 
(rehearsal) and subsequent performance on the task. It is, however, not clear whether this 
pattern will generalise to a naturalistic task with a long time delay.  
 Moreover, previous research on time-based prospective memory has produced 
some discrepant findings between laboratory and naturalistic studies. In all experimenter 
controlled studies, the frequency of monitoring substantially increases in the final 
critical period for responding, thus, producing a J-shaped curve. 2  However, in the only 
existing naturalistic study on frequency of rehearsal in time-based prospective memory 
task no such pattern was observed (see Sellen et al., 1997). It was therefore anticipated 
that the results of the present study could be instrumental in solving this discrepancy.  
 By asking the participants to record the activities they were engaged in at the time 
of rehearsal we also wanted to examine whether these predominantly occurred while 
people were engaged in relatively habitual automatic activities that require little attentional 
resources (such as tidying up a room, having a shower, lying in bed, etc.). A couple of 
previous naturalistic studies have shown that this may be the case. For example, in the 
study of Sellen et al. (1997) participants tended to think about the time-based task in 
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transitional places like staircases and corridors rather than their offices where they would 
be engaged in more attentionally demanding activities (cf. Ellis & Nimmo-Smith, 1993). 
Method 
 Participants. Forty psychology undergraduate students (8 males and 32 females) 
aged between 18 to 47 years took part in the study. They received course credit for their 
participation.  
 Materials and Procedure. All participants individually attended an initial Monday 
session between 11:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m.  After being introduced to the general aims of 
the study (i.e., how people remember to carry out an everyday task in the future without 
the help of external reminders), participants were informed that their task was to 
telephone the experimenter on the seventh day of the experiment (i.e., on Sunday) at a 
convenient time for them between 10:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. Participants were asked to 
choose the time for the telephone call themselves because it was important that they 
would be free to make the call at that particular time. It was pointed out that if they forgot 
to ring the number at this pre-arranged time they had to ring as soon as possible 
afterwards. The times were always scheduled at 30-minute intervals and the experimenter 
made sure that two participants did not choose the same time for the call.  After this, 
participants were provided with a pocket size diary in which to record those instances 
when they happened to recall or rehearse their intention to give the phone call to the 
experimenter. The diaries had to be kept from the moment participants left the laboratory 
up until the specified call in time on the following Sunday.  It was emphasised that 
participants had to refrain from using any external memory aids such as making notes in 
personal diaries or calendars or asking someone to remind them of their intention.  
 Next, participants were given detailed instructions how to fill in the diary (a copy 
of these instructions was given to them to take home).  Whenever they rehearsed the 
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telephone task, participants had to record the following information on a separate page of 
the diary: the date and time of the rehearsal, the time it was recorded, where they were, 
who they were with, any thoughts they had immediately before the rehearsal, the nature 
of any triggers/cues considered to prompt the rehearsal, and the activity they were 
engaged in at the time.  Participants had to record each case immediately or as soon as 
possible after the rehearsal of the task had taken place. If no rehearsals were experienced 
participants were asked to try not to generate them on purpose. 
 Finally, participants were informed that it was necessary to keep the diary with 
them at all times during the week and preferably out of their sight. They were advised to 
keep the diary in a place where the likelihood of their seeing it in the course of the day 
was minimal (e.g., in a part of their bag that they did not normally use or in a pocket that 
they did not normally refer to).  
 When participants telephoned the experimenter on Sunday the time of their call 
was noted and any feedback from the participants concerning the task and/or the 
procedure was recorded. In addition, participants had to indicate how motivated they had 
been to ring on time on a 7-point scale (1 = not very motivated to 7 = very motivated). 
Finally, a meeting with the experimenter was arranged so that participants could return 
their diary and receive course credit for participation. 
Results 
 The rejection level for all analyses reported in this and subsequent studies was set 
at .05. The effect sizes were estimated by using the partial eta-squared (η 2). 
All 40 participants kept a diary for the 7-day period and recorded a total of 363 
rehearsals (M= 9.08, SD=7.18). However, 10% of these rehearsals (N=36) belonged to 
one participant who was a clear outlier in the initial screening of the data. Therefore, the 
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data of this participant were excluded from all the analyses reported in this section. This 
resulted in a total of 327 rehearsals with a range of 2 to 26 and a mean of 8.38 (SD=5.77). 
 None of the participants forgot completely to make a designated telephone call on 
Sunday. There was, however, a fair amount of variability in the length of time that 
elapsed from designated time to the time of actual phone call. Thus, 23 participants 
(59%) remembered to call within the 10 minutes of critical time (which was counted as 
on-time response), and 16 participants (41%) were more than 10 minutes late. Out of 
these, six participants called after 10 minutes but within one hour, and ten participants 
were more than one hour late (with the latest response being 8 hours late). However, their 
post-experimental ratings of motivation to make a phone call at a designated time on 
Sunday was not statistically different (M=4.69, SD=1.20) from that of the participants 
who remembered to call on time (M=5.04, SD=1.72) (F<1). Moreover, out of 16 late 
callers only three indicated that they remembered but were unable to make a phone call at 
a designated time. The other participants who were late admitted they had forgotten about 
the task and remembered only at some later point.  
Results will be presented in two parts. In the first part we will report the analyses 
of the conditions in which the rehearsals were experienced (and recorded). The primary 
focus in this section will be on the relationship between the rehearsals and reported 
triggers (whether external or internal), if any. In addition, the idea that rehearsals are 
more likely to occur when one is engaged in habitual automatic activities will also be 
examined. In the second part, we will examine participants' prospective memory 
performance and its relation to the number of recorded rehearsals as well as a distribution 
of rehearsals over the 7-day period. 
Conditions of reported rehearsals 
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 Types of reported triggers. We first examined whether each recorded rehearsal 
was reported as being triggered by a cue. Out of 327 rehearsals recorded by 39 
participants, 247 (76%) were reported as being triggered by something whereas 80 (24%) 
were reported to have occurred without any trigger (i.e., the intention was thought to have 
popped into mind for no apparent reason). 
 Two raters (the first and the second author) independently read the descriptions of 
triggers provided by participants for the 247 triggered rehearsals. A trigger was 
categorised as external if it referred to something in the participants’ environment, and as 
internal if it referred to something in their own thoughts. Agreement between the raters 
was excellent (Cohen's Kappa=.98, SE=.06), and any discrepancies were resolved by 
discussion. Thus, out of 247 triggered rehearsals, 147 (60%) were classed as triggered 
externally and 100 (40%) as triggered internally. This difference was statistically 
significant (χ2=8.94, df=1, p=.003). 
Tables 1a and 1b display the types of external and internal triggers reported by 
participants. Table 1a shows that the majority of external triggers were thematically 
related to the task of making a phone call (e.g., seeing a phone, a diary or a clock).  It was 
also common to experience triggers from seeing, reading or hearing things associated 
with the experiment such as a lecturer talking about memory, seeing someone resembling 
the experimenter or reading a passage "little of your overt behavior sheds any light on 
what is going inside your mind". There were also a small number of cues that seemed to 
be completely unrelated to the task of making the phone call (for examples see Table 1a). 
Thus, there is a great variety of possible cues in one’s environment that could act as 
incidental triggers reminding participants of their future intention.  
 Table 1b shows that the majority of internal triggers involved thinking about 
future plans, other intentions or things that were only associatively related to the task of 
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making a phone call. Only thinking about future plans could be considered as triggers for 
deliberate self-initiated rehearsal. It appears that at certain points in the course of their 
daily activities our participants would deliberately engage in thinking about their plans 
for the day, for the weekend or for their general schedule. If the intention to make a 
phone call occurred while being engaged in such planning this should be classed as 
deliberate self-initiated rehearsal (see Ellis & Nimmo-Smith, 1993). In contrast, thinking 
about work, deadlines, or about other intentions, such as phoning someone, would be 
examples of incidental (internal) triggers.  Incidental triggers related to other intentions 
are particularly interesting, as they did not always have a direct association with the task. 
For example, reminding oneself to post a letter or remembering to buy groceries have no 
direct relation to the telephone task apart from being other prospective memory tasks.   
Categorization of all internal triggers as either self-initiated planning or incidental 
thoughts was highly reliable (Kappa=.95, SE=.10).  Out of the 100 internal triggers, 29% 
were classed as self-initiated planning and 71% as incidental thoughts.  Thus, internal 
triggers were more likely to be incidental than self-initiated (χ2=17.64, df=1, p<.001). 
In conclusion, out of a total of 327 recorded rehearsals only 9% (N=29) were 
coded as being cued by self-initiated planning thoughts. Forty-five percent were coded as 
being triggered by incidental external (N=147) and 22% by incidental internal cues 
(N=71). In 24% of cases (N=80) the rehearsals were reported to have no apparent triggers 
(i.e., intention would simply pop into one's mind).  
The mean number of rehearsals as a function of trigger can be seen in Table 2 
(Panel A). A one way within subject ANOVA on these means resulted in a significant 
effect of trigger category (F(3,114)=10.88, MSe=5.72, p<.001, η 2=.22). Post hoc analyses 
showed that the number of reported rehearsals in the incidental external trigger category 
was significantly higher than in the no trigger category (t=-2.38, df=38, p<.03). Although 
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the number of rehearsals in the no trigger category was numerically higher than in the 
incidental internal category this difference was not statistically significant (t<1). Finally, 
the number of rehearsals in the incidental internal category was significantly higher than in 
the self-initiated category (t=-5.15, df=38, p<.001).  
  Activities. Activities that do not put heavy demands on attentional resources such 
as walking or cleaning teeth were regarded as automatic activities whereas activities that 
have heavy attentional demands, such as being in a lecture, reading a book or writing an 
essay, were categorised as controlled activities (cf. Berntsen, 1998; Kvavilashvili & 
Mandler, 2004; Norman, & Shallice, 1986). Agreement between the two raters was 
excellent (Kappa = .95, SE=.06) and the discrepancies were resolved by discussion. Out 
of the 320 activities recorded by participants 62% (N=198) were classed as automatic, 
and 38% (N=122) as controlled. 3  Thus, participants were more likely to report 
experiencing rehearsals when they were engaged in automatic than in controlled activities 
(χ2 = 18.05, df=1, p<.001). Moreover, the majority of rehearsals (217 rehearsals out of 
327, i.e., 66%) were reported to take place at home rather than in the outside world, work, 
or university where one is generally less likely to be relaxing or engaged in automatic 
activities. 
Prospective memory performance and its relation to frequency of rehearsals 
 As noted earlier, none of the participants forgot to make a phone call on Sunday. 
The majority of the calls (N=23) were made on time (i.e., within ±10 minutes of the 
critical time) but as many as 16 calls were made more than 10 minutes late. The former 
were classified as HIT and the latter as LATE responses. However, the response of one 
participant who reported remembering on time but being unable to make a phone call was 
classed as HIT whereas the data of two participants who reported being late because they 
slept in were eliminated from these analyses. There was a reliable and positive correlation 
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between the number of recorded rehearsals and the type of prospective memory response 
(Point-Biserial correlation r(36)=.39, p<.02) with those in the HIT group reporting more 
rehearsals (M=10.21, SD=6.43) than those in the LATE group (M=5.46, SD=2.75). 
 We also examined the pattern of rehearsals over the seven days of the study as a 
function of response group (HIT vs. LATE). Because on Monday, and especially on 
Sunday, participants had less time available to experience (and record) their rehearsals, it 
was decided to use a proportional measure of rehearsals by dividing the number of 
rehearsals on each day by the total number of possible waking hours available on that 
day. For Monday the initial session with the participants ended on average at 12:00 p.m., 
therefore the number of hours available was taken from 12:00 p.m. to 24:00 a.m. (12 
hours). For Tuesday to Saturday the time was taken from 08:00 a.m. to 24:00 a.m. (16 
hours).  On Sunday the number of hours was taken as the difference between 08:00 and 
the time each participant was required to call (i.e., between 10:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m.). 
 The mean proportional scores as dependent variables were entered into a 2 
response group (HIT vs. LATE) x 7 days (Monday vs. Tuesday vs. Wednesday vs. 
Thursday vs. Friday vs. Saturday vs. Sunday) mixed ANOVA with the repeated measures 
on the last factor. 4  There was a main effect of response group (F(1,35)= 9.22, 
MSe=.034, p<.005, η 2 =.21) as well as days (F(6, 210)= 8.37, MSe=.034, p<.002, 
η 2=.19). These main effects were, however, qualified by a significant group by days 
interaction (F(6,210)= 4.68, MSe=.034, p<.02, η 2=.12).  
 The tests of simple main effects showed that although the two response groups did 
not reliably differ in the proportion of recorded rehearsals on Monday (F(1,35)=1.43, 
p=.24), Wednesday (F(1,35)=1.88, p=.18), Thursday (F(1,35)=2.00, p=.17) and Friday 
(F(1,35)=1.25, p=.27), participants in the HIT group recorded significantly more rehearsals 
on Tuesday (F(1,35)=6.31, p<.02, η 2=.15) and especially on the last two days of the task: 
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Saturday (F(1,35)=11.02, p<.005, η 2=.24) and Sunday (F(1,35)=8.31, p<.01, η 2=.19). In 
other words, the HIT group displayed a clear J-shaped pattern of rehearsals (see Figure 1): 
the proportions of rehearsals on Monday and Tuesday did not significantly differ from 
each other and were reliably higher than on Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Saturday 
(all ps <.02), whereas the proportion of rehearsals on the final day of the study (i.e., on 
Sunday) was reliably higher than on any other day of the study (all ps<.005). This pattern 
was absent in the LATE group as the proportion of recorded rehearsals on Sunday was not 
statistically different from those on any other day of the study (all ps≥.47). 
Discussion  
In conclusion, several novel findings emerged from Study 1. The most important 
finding concerns the nature of retrieval processes in time-based prospective memory tasks 
with a long delay interval. The results showed that once the intention is formed it is either 
triggered by incidental cues or it periodically pops into one's mind without any apparent 
reason. Self-initiated rehearsal was reported to occur in only 9% of cases. Therefore, the 
retrieval of time-based tasks could be a more automatic process than thought previously. 
Successful performance on the phone task was positively related to the number of 
recorded rehearsals and, importantly, the distribution of rehearsals in the HIT group was 
different from the LATE group and resembled the J-shaped curve. These findings clearly 
contrast the results of Sellen et al. (1997) who failed to obtain the J-shaped curve for a 
naturalistic time-based task in which participants had to remember to press an electronic 
badge four times a day for a 5-day period. Instead, the results of the present study 
replicate previous laboratory and controlled studies of time-based prospective memory 
with considerably shorter delay intervals of 3 to 30 minutes (e.g., see Ceci & 
Bronfenbrenner, 1985; Einstein et al., 1995; Harris & Wilkins, 1982).  
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Finally, the rehearsals were reported to occur more frequently when participants 
were engaged in relatively automatic (62%) rather than in attentionally demanding 
controlled activities (38%), thus replicating earlier findings of Ellis and Nimmo-Smith 
(1993) and Sellen et al. (1997). It appears that certain amount of unused attentional 
resources must be available for one to become conscious of the future intention despite 
the fact that the act of retrieval itself may not be a cognitively demanding task (cf. 
Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004; Mandler, 1994). 5  
It is, of course, possible that the present finding reflects the difficulty or 
reluctance to record the rehearsals that occurred during attentionally demanding 
activities. However, in the study of Sellen et al. (1997) where the interference from 
recording a rehearsal was minimal (participants had to simply click on the electronic 
badges that they wore during the study), the rehearsals were still more likely to be 
reported during the automatic than controlled activities. Another possibility is that the 
obtained result reflects general prevalence of automatic activities in everyday life as 
shown by Ellis and Nimmo-Smith (1993). However, in their study, participants did report 
reliably lower levels of concentration on concurrent activities when thinking about future 
intentions than when being stopped at random time intervals in the baseline condition. 
Thus, the available evidence including the current study, seems to suggest that rehearsals 
are more likely to occur during relatively undemanding activities. The results of Ellis and 
Nimmo-Smith (1993), however, highlight the importance of measuring concentration in 
addition to obtaining the descriptions of ongoing activities. These measures were 
obtained in Study 2 and 3 (see below).   
Study 2 
 Study 1 is the first empirical investigation on the nature of rehearsal and retrieval 
processes in remembering everyday time-based tasks with a long delay of several days. 
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The aim of Study 2 was to replicate these findings on new samples of both young and old 
participants in order to learn more about the possible mechanisms underlying the retrieval 
of time-based tasks. The rationale for testing a group of older adults was to determine if 
the pattern of results observed in Study 1 would generalise to another population. 
 The investigation of age effects is one of the most intensively studied areas in 
prospective memory research (cf. Ellis & Kvavilashvili, 2000; see also Henry, MacLeod, 
Phillips, & Crawford, 2004).  This is partly due to the importance that preserved 
prospective memory skills play in maintaining a successful and independent life-style in 
old age. However, despite considerable progress that has been made over the past 
decades in studying aging and prospective memory, recent research has revealed a 
paradoxical finding. Although age effects have been obtained in several laboratory 
studies of prospective memory (e.g., Maylor, 1993; 1998; Park et al., 1997; West & 
Craik, 1999) no such effects have been observed in studies conducted outside the 
laboratory. If anything, in the naturalistic studies conducted by Rendell and Thompson 
(1999) and Rendell and Craik (2000) old participants consistently outperformed young 
participants in both event- and time-based prospective memory tasks that were embedded 
in the course of their everyday activities (see also Henry et al., 2004). 
 Several explanations have been put forward to account for this paradoxical 
finding. According to one view, older adults might be using external aids more frequently 
and/or efficiently than the young (Cavanaugh, Grady & Perlmutter, 1983; Maylor, 1990; 
Moscovitch, 1982).  Alternatively, they may have more opportunities to rehearse the task 
due to being engaged in habitual and attentionally less demanding activities (cf. Maylor, 
1998).  It has been also suggested that older adults may be more motivated to remember 
to execute actions in naturalistic settings (see Patton & Meit, 1993; Rendell & Craik, 
2000). However, the explanation concerning the increased use of external aids by older 
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adults has not received empirical support. Several naturalistic studies that directly 
addressed this question failed to find any age effects in self-reported use of external aids, 
both in terms of frequency and effectiveness of their use (see e.g., d’Ydewalle, 1996; 
Freeman & Ellis, 2003; Rendell & Thomson, 1999). To date, the remaining two 
explanations concerning increased rehearsal and motivation in older adults have not been 
examined in detail.   
 The aim of Study 2 was not only to replicate the findings from Study 1 but also to 
examine which of these explanations might be contributing to the absence of age effects 
on prospective memory outside the laboratory. Thus, we wanted to determine whether 
older adults rehearse the prospective memory task more frequently than younger adults, 
and if so, whether this is related to their performance success. Moreover, following 
Patton and Meit (1993), we expected that old participants could be intrinsically more 
motivated than young to perform the task. It was therefore hypothesised that 
experimentally manipulating levels of motivation should influence prospective 
remembering more in young than older adults.   
 Participants in Study 2 were required to complete the same task as in Study 1.  
However, to manipulate and measure motivation, participants from both age groups were 
allocated to a high and low motivation condition and were also required to rate their 
motivation levels before and after the task. 
Method 
 Participants. A total of 74 volunteers took part in the study. Thirty-six 
participants were young (20 females and 16 males) with a mean age of 23 years (range 
19-30), and 38 were old (24 females and 14 males) with a mean age of 73 years (range 62 
- 82). All old and 11 young participants were recruited from an existing subject pool of 
volunteers.  The remaining 25 young participants were recruited from the local 
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community (N=7), University staff (N=8), and undergraduate (N=7) and postgraduate 
students in psychology (N=3). 
All older participants were retired, healthy adults.  They did not report any vision, 
hearing and physical mobility problems or any serious physical/mental health conditions 
diagnosed by their physician. Their mean rating of self-reported health on a 5-point scale 
(1=poor; 3=average; 5=excellent) was high (M=4.09; SD=.63) and did not differ (F<1) 
from that of the young group (M=4.11, SD=.79). When participants had to rate their 
health in comparison to their peers (1=worse, 3=same and 5=significantly better), older 
participants’ ratings (M=3.82, SD=.81) were reliably higher than those of young 
participants (M=3.29, SD=71), F(1,66) =8.35, MSe =.58, p < .02, η 2 =.11. There were no 
reliable age effects in participants’ scores on the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
(HADS; Zigmund & Snaith, 1983; on both scales scores can vary from 0 to a maximum 
of 21 with higher scores indicating higher levels of anxiety and depression). The mean 
anxiety scores were 7.11(SD=3.83) and 5.93(SD=3.11) in the young and old group, 
respectively (F(1,66)=1.91, MSe=12.26 p=.17). The mean depression scores were 3.68 
(SD=2.94) in the young and 3.27(SD=2.24) in the old group (F<1).     
 All older participants had previously scored above the cut off point of 24 on the 
Mini Mental State Examination in a study by Kvavilashvili, Kornbrot, Mash, Cockburn 
and Milne (2005).  The older sample in that study obtained significantly higher scores 
than the young group on the vocabulary sub-test (Spot-the-Word Test) of the Speed and 
Capacity of Language Processing Test (Baddeley, Emslie, & Nimmo-Smith, 1993). 
 Materials and Procedure. These were similar to Study 1 except for minor 
modifications in the diary format, the place of initial meetings, and the timing of call-in 
times.  Participants individually attended an initial Monday session, between 9:00 a.m. 
and 7:00 p.m. either in participants’ homes (38 old and 16 young) or at the university (20 
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young). Participants were free to choose any time for a telephone call on Sunday. This 
was done to minimise the chances of remembering to make a call on time but being 
unable to do so due to some other engagements.  Although the majority of participants 
chose the time between 11:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., the earliest time chosen was 9:00 a.m. 
and the latest was 9:00 p.m. 
 The motivational manipulation involved telling half of the participants in each age 
group that it was very important that they called exactly within ten minutes of their 
chosen time. If they did not call within ten minutes all their diary entries were to be 
discarded as the study was allegedly only interested in those thinking processes that result 
in successful, on time remembering.  In the low motivation condition participants were 
simply asked to call within ten minutes of the designated time as in Study 1.  
  Participants were provided a diary to record any subsequent thoughts about the 
task (i.e., rehearsals). The information to be recorded was same as in Study 1 except for 
the following. First, in addition to describing the activities they were engaged in during 
the reported rehearsal participants had to also rate how much they were concentrating on 
this activity on a 5 point rating scale (1=not concentrating at all, 5=fully concentrating).  
Second, in order to obtain a more accurate measure of number of rehearsals 
conditionalized on the number of waking hours on each day, the participants had to 
indicate at what times they usually woke up and went to sleep on each day of the week.6  
 At the end of the initial session participants were asked to rate how motivated 
they felt to call the experimenter on time on a five point rating scale (1=not motivated at 
all, 3=moderately motivated, 5=very motivated). When the participants telephoned the 
experimenter the time of their call was noted and they had to make a second (this time 
retrospective) rating of their motivation on the same 5-point rating scale.  
Results  
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 All 74 volunteers, except one young participant, kept a diary for a 7-day period 
and a total of 1092 rehearsals were recorded (M=14.96, SD=15.13). However, 20.5% of 
these rehearsals was recorded by one young (N=73) and two old participants (N=112, and 
N=39) who were clear outliers as shown by the initial data screening. The data of these 
three participants were excluded from all the analyses reported in this section. The final 
sample therefore consisted of 34 young and 36 old participants who recorded a total of 
868 rehearsals with the mean of 12.40 (SD=6.64; range 2-26). 
 Two young and one old participant did not call on Sunday. When contacted next 
morning they admitted having completely forgotten to make the phone call. Out of the 
remaining 67 participants who called on Sunday, 52 (78%) remembered to call on time, 
and 15 (22%) were more than 10 minutes late. In the latter group, six participants called 
after 10 minutes but within one hour, and nine were late for more than one hour (with the 
latest response being 7 hours and 20 minutes late). None of the participants who were late 
indicated that they remembered on time but were unable to make a call at that time.   
 The experimental manipulation of motivation did not have reliable effects on 
prospective memory performance, number of reported rehearsals, pre- and post-test ratings 
of motivation and did not interact with age (all F<1). The only effect that approached 
significance was the age by motivation interaction for the number of reported rehearsals 
(F(1, 66)=3.55, p=.06, η 2 =.05), with old group reporting more rehearsals than the young 
in the high motivation condition (M=14.83 and M=10.29, respectively) but not in the low 
motivation condition (M=11.50 for old, and M=12.88 for young). All the analyses reported 
in this section are therefore based on the data pooled across the motivation manipulation.  
Effects of age on prospective memory and the number of reported rehearsals  
 Following Study 1, calls made within ± 10 minutes of the pre-arranged time were 
classed as HITs and those made after 10 minutes as LATE responses. A failure to make 
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this call on Sunday (3 participants) was also classed into the latter category. In the young 
group 68% (N=23) remembered to call on time and 32% (N=11) were late. In the old 
group 81% (N=29) remembered on time and 19% (N=7) were late. Although older 
participants displayed numerically better performance than young participants this 
difference was not statistically significant (χ2 = 1.52, df=1, p=.21).  
 Next, we examined age effects on those variables that could potentially explain 
why old participants were as good as young in remembering to make the phone call. For 
example, it is possible that good prospective memory performance in older adults was 
maintained by either a larger number and different pattern of recorded rehearsals, higher 
levels of self-reported motivation or both. It was also interesting to see if older people 
were more likely to report being engaged in automatic activities than young people. 
Effects of age on number and distribution of reported rehearsals    
 In total, 34 young participants recorded 394 rehearsals (range 2-26) and 36 old 
participants – 474 rehearsals (range 5-26). Hence, the mean number of recorded 
rehearsals was 11.59 (SD=6.91,) in the young group and 13.17 (SD=6.39) in the old 
group. The difference between these means was not statistically significant (F<1). There 
was also no age effect (F<1) in the distribution of rehearsals across the seven days of the 
study as revealed by the 2 (age group) x 7 (days) mixed ANOVA. The only significant 
effect that emerged from this analysis was the main effect of days (F(6,402)=15.90, 
p<.005, MSe=.07,η 2 =.19). Figure 2 shows that both age groups exhibited a clear J-
shaped pattern: the proportion of rehearsals per hour reported on the first and last day of 
the task was reliably higher than those reported during the middle five days of the study 
(all ps<.001), and the proportion of rehearsals on Sunday (M=.44) was almost twice as 
high than on Monday (M=.24) (p<.05). Importantly, when the same 2 (age) x 7 (days) 
ANOVA was repeated on those 11 young and 7 old participants who were late none of 
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the above effects were significant (all Fs<2.13), indicating that the J-shaped pattern is due 
to the participants who remembered to call on time. 
Like in Study 1, there was a significant positive correlation between successful 
performance and number of recorded rehearsals in the young group (r(33)=.53, p=.001). 
However, this correlation was not significant in the old group (r(35)=.14, p=.43), the 
majority of old participants (81%) remembered to make a phone call on time irrespective 
of the number of reported rehearsals that ranged from 5 to 26. 
Effect of age on self-reported levels of motivation  
 All participants rated the levels of their intrinsic motivation to remember to make 
a phone call on a 5-point scale (1=not motivated at all, 5=very motivated). These ratings 
were entered into 2 age group (young vs. old) x 2 time of rating (before vs. after the 
study) mixed ANOVA with the repeated measures on the last factor (for means see Table 
3). There was a marginally significant effect of time of rating (F(1,68)=3.94, MSe= .47, 
p=.05, η 2 =.06) with ratings of importance being somewhat lower after the study 
(M=3.81, SD=.92) than at the beginning of the study (M=4.04, SD=.89). Most 
importantly, there was the main effect of age (F(1,68)= 23.79, MSe=.89, p<.001) with a 
large effect size (η 2 =.26). Old participants’ self-rated levels of intrinsic motivation were 
significantly higher (M=4.31, SD=.59) than those of young participants (M=3.55, 
SD=.74) irrespective when the ratings were taken (before or after the study). Interaction 
between the independent variables was not significant (F<1). 
Effects of age on type of ongoing activities and ratings of concentration 
 The activities reported by participants were categorised as automatic or controlled 
by two raters using the same coding procedure as in Study 1. Agreement between the 
raters was excellent (for the young group Kappa = .95, SE=.02; for the old - Kappa=.93, 
SE=.02), and discrepancies were solved by discussion. Out of 392 descriptions provided 
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by the young group, 54% of cases (N=213) were classed as automatic and 46% (N=179) 
as controlled. In the older group, 66% of reported activities (N=310) were classed as 
automatic, and 34% (N=161) as controlled.  This difference between the age groups was 
statistically significant (χ2=11.81, N=863, df=1, p=.001). 7 Given that older group 
consisted of retired people it is perhaps unsurprising that older participants were also 
more likely to report experiencing rehearsals at home (84%) than young participants 
(55%) (χ2 =92.66, N=686, df=1, p<.0001). 
 However, the analysis of participants’ self-reported levels of concentration on a 5-
point scale (1=not concentrating at all, and 5=fully concentrating) showed an opposite 
pattern. For this analysis, scale points 1 and 2 were categorised as "low concentration", 
point 3 as "medium concentration" and points 4 and 5 as "high concentration". The 
number of cases as a function of age group and concentration level (low vs. moderate vs. 
high) are presented in Table 4.  This table shows that while young participants are more 
likely to report low levels of concentration (40%) than the old group (30%), the latter is 
more likely to report high levels of concentration (45%) than the young group (35%) 
(χ2=10.23, df=2, p=.006). Taken together, these results provide support for the idea that 
with increased age automatic activities may require more attentional resources and higher 
levels of concentration on these tasks (see e.g., Lindenberger, Marsiske & Baltes, 2000).  
Effects of age on the types of reported triggers  
 Finally, we addressed the most important question concerning the triggers of 
recorded rehearsals. Our aim was to replicate the pattern of results in Study 1 in the 
young group and to see if there were any age effects in the types of reported triggers.  For 
this purpose, the diary entries of all participants were examined to see whether they were 
reported as being triggered by something or whether the task just popped into mind 
without any obvious triggers. Next, those rehearsals that were reported as being triggered 
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were categorised by two independent raters according to whether the trigger was 
something external in the environment or internal in one's thoughts. Further, those 
rehearsals that were categorised as being triggered by internal thoughts were further 
classified into those cued accidentally by related thoughts or cued by self-initiated 
planning thoughts. The agreement between the raters was excellent (Cohen’s Kappas 
were .92 and .91, respectively) and any disagreements were solved by discussion.  
The mean number of rehearsals in each of these four trigger categories (no trigger, 
incidental external, incidental internal, self-initiated planning thoughts) as a function of 
age group is presented in Table 2 (Panel B). These means were entered into 2 (age group) 
x 4 (trigger category) mixed ANOVA with the repeated measures on the last factor. 
There was no significant effect of age (F(1,68)=1.06, MSe=11.02, p=.31) but there was a 
highly significant effect of trigger category (F(3,204)=21.39, MSe=9.03, p<.001, 
η 2 =.24).  Planned comparisons showed that the mean number of reported rehearsals in 
the no trigger category (M=5.30, SD=4.60) was significantly higher than in the external 
trigger category (M=3.37, SD=2.81) (t=2.96, df=69, p=.004) which, in turn, was 
significantly higher than in the internal trigger category (M=2.30, SD=2.20) (t=3.05, 
df=69, p=.003). The difference between the latter and the self-initiated category (M=1.40, 
SD=2.18) was also statistically significant (t=-2.62, df=69, p=.01). Although older 
participants recorded numerically more rehearsals with no reported triggers (M=6.22, 
SD=5.30) than the young group (M=4.32, SD=3.56), the age by trigger category 
interaction was not statistically significant (F(3,204)=2.41, MSe=9.03, p=.09). 
Discussion 
On the whole, the results of Study 2 replicated the main findings from Study 1 and, 
additionally, provided us with some important insights about the effects of age on 
remembering time-based tasks outside the laboratory. Thus, the old group was as good as 
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the young group at making a phone call on time. This high level of performance was not, 
however, achieved by older adults reporting higher number of rehearsals than younger 
adults. Most importantly, there were no age differences in the type of reported rehearsals 
with the smallest number of rehearsals falling into the category of self-initiated rehearsals 
in both groups (15% in young and 8% in old). In addition, both young and old participants 
appear to have similar J-shaped pattern of rehearsal over the 7 days of the study.  
 Results concerning intrinsic motivation and ongoing activities are also interesting, 
especially in relation to the prospective memory and aging paradox. Thus, old 
participants reported higher levels of intrinsic motivation for the prospective memory 
task and were more likely to report being engaged in automatic activities than young 
participants. However, old participants were also more likely to report concentrating their 
attention on these activities. In other words, for older adults simple automatic activities 
may be more demanding than for younger adults. Taken together, this pattern of results 
appears to indicate that the discrepancies across laboratory and naturalistic studies of 
prospective memory and aging could be due to possible differences between young and 
old participants’ levels of motivation and attentional demands of ongoing activities in and 
outside the laboratory. These points will be examined in more detail in the discussion. 
 Finally, the experimental manipulation of motivation did not produce any 
significant effects on prospective memory and rehearsal. This was surprising given that 
participants in the high motivation group knew that all their rehearsals recorded during 
the one-week period would be discarded even if they were only 30 seconds over the 
critical 10-minute period.  This contrasts the results of laboratory studies in which the 
effects of motivation have been obtained by simply telling participants that their 
performance in the prospective memory task is more important than in the ongoing task 
(Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2001) or that they will be very helpful to the 
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experimenter if they do not forget the task (Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 2001, July). The fact 
that effects of motivation can be obtained in the lab with relatively weak verbal 
manipulations but not outside the laboratory is in itself an interesting finding and may be 
indicative of somewhat different processes being in operation in and outside the 
laboratory. It is also possible that, in the present study, intrinsic motivation to perform the 
naturalistic task was so high that any additional verbal manipulation could not further 
increase it. Indeed, the majority of participants in the low motivation condition were 
choosing the ratings on the upper end of the 5-point scale (points 4 and 5) in both young 
and especially old participants (59% and 79%, respectively). None of the old and only 
one young participant chose the ratings of 1 or 2 on the scale.    
Study 3 
The major finding that emerged from Study 1 and 2 is that the occurrence of 
reported rehearsals in time-based tasks, and ultimately their retrieval, is mediated by three 
different routes in both young and old participants. In stark contrast to most currently 
prevailing ideas about time-based prospective memory only one of these routes involved 
deliberate self-initiated retrieval, and importantly, this route was reported to have been 
used least frequently. The remaining two routes seemed to involve involuntary automatic 
processes with thoughts about the task being reported to pop into one’s mind in response 
to incidental cues or with no apparent triggers at all.  
If time-based prospective memory is primarily mediated by automatic processes, 
as these results seem to suggest, does this mean that the retrieval of time-based tasks in 
everyday life is not different from that of event-based tasks? For example, according to 
McDaniel and Einstein’s (2000) influential multiprocess account there is a general bias to 
rely on spontaneous retrieval processes in event-based tasks even though under some 
conditions people may adopt more effortful and conscious monitoring strategies. An 
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important question that needs to be answered in the light of our findings is to find out in 
what ways, if at all, is the retrieval of naturalistic time- and event-based tasks different. 
One obvious difference is that the successful remembering in the event-based tasks 
may require less number of rehearsals because people rely on the target event, especially if 
this event is distinctive and salient, to act as a cue to remind them of the task (e.g., 
Brandimonte & Passolunghi, 1994; McDaniel & Einstein, 1993). For example, in the 
naturalistic study that directly compared event- and time based tasks (Sellen et al., 1997) 
participants reported thinking about (i.e., rehearsing) a time-based task more frequently than 
an event-based task (for similar results obtained in the laboratory on young and old 
participants see Kvavilashvili et al., 2005). However, no previous study has examined the 
processes/triggers that bring the event-based task to one’s mind in the delay interval and 
compared these to the ones in the time-based tasks.  
Study 3 was conducted to answer this important question by testing two groups of 
young participants one of which was assigned to a time-based task of making a phone call 
at a pre-arranged time in one week’s time, and another to an event-based task of making a 
phone call in response to a certain event (a text message from Lycos.co.uk) which occurred 
in exactly one week from the initial session. Like in Study 1 and 2, all participants had to 
keep a diary and record their thoughts about the task during the delay interval. 
Based on previous findings, it was predicted that participants in the time-based 
condition would report experiencing more thoughts about the task than those in the event-
based condition. In addition, while J-shaped pattern was expected to occur in the time-based 
task, no such pattern was expected in the event-based task with the number of thoughts 
being at a relatively low rate throughout the delay period. Most importantly, it was 
predicted that while time- and event-based conditions would not differ in the number of 
rehearsals triggered by incidental (external and internal) cues, participants in the time-based 
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condition would report significantly more rehearsals instigated by self-initiated planning 
thoughts and especially rehearsals with no triggers and than those in the event-based 
condition.  
Method 
Participants. Forty-three psychology undergraduates (7 males and 36 females) 
whose age ranged from 18 to 24 years, took part in a study in exchange of course credit. 
Twenty-two participants were assigned to the event-based condition and 21 participants to 
the time-based condition. 
Materials and Procedure. These were similar to those in Study 1 and Study 2 (the 
condition with no motivation manipulation) except for the following modifications. First, 
the day of initial meeting was changed from Monday to either Tuesday or Wednesday 
(between 3:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m.). This was done to eliminate the possibility that the 
increased number of rehearsals reported in Study 1 and 2 on the final day of the task 
coincided with the weekend (i.e., Sunday) when people are involved in more undemanding 
leisurely activities.  
Second, all participants were instructed to start the diary-keeping task the day after 
the initial meeting (i.e., on Wednesday or Thursday) and to record only those rehearsals that 
occurred between 9:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. This would ensure that the diary was kept for the 
same number of hours each day and eliminate the necessity of using proportionalized scores 
when assessing the pattern of rehearsals across the 7 days of the study. Indeed one could 
argue that the J-shaped curve was obtained in Study 1 and 2 because there were fewer hours 
available for recording rehearsals on Monday and especially on Sunday.  
Furthermore, the experimenter used an iMac computer to generate the text 
message from Lycos.co.uk to all participants who took part in the event-based task. In 
particular, a user name coined Lycos.co.uk was set up on the Lycos.co.uk site in order to 
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construct and send out text-messages. The message read ‘ Have a nice day!’ which was 
placed three lines down from the page. This initial text message was sent to a Sony 
Ericsson T610 mobile phone, one of two phones the experimenter had. It was from this 
phone that all text-messages were generated to all participants. Due to the fact that this 
phone had status report facility, it was possible for the experimenter to know the exact 
time when the participant received the text message. An additional 6310i Nokia mobile 
was used to answer the calls made by participants. 
  Upon their arrival at the laboratory, all participants were asked to fill in a short 4-
item questionnaire assessing their mobile phone use and habits. All participants reported 
to own a mobile phone and use it on daily basis. Participants were then informed in detail 
of the required task. Participants in the time-based condition were told that they had to 
call the experimenter in seven days time at a time most convenient for them. The seventh 
day was either on Tuesday or Wednesday. The available time-slots were arranged in 
intervals of 30 minutes, starting at 7:00 p.m. and ending at 9:00 p.m. Minor time 
adjustments of ±15 minutes were made for those who could not call during these times. 
Participants had to keep a diary from 9:00 a.m. next morning until the time of their 
arranged phone call on Tuesday or Wednesday evening.  
In contrast, participants assigned to the event-based condition were informed that 
they had to call the experimenter immediately after receiving a text-message from 
Lycos.co.uk. They were asked to keep a diary from 9:00 a.m. next morning until the 
moment they received this text message which could occur any day during the next ten 
days. However, all participants in the event-based condition received the text-message on 
the seventh day between 7 p.m. and 9 p.m. The text-message was often sent out to 
participants straight after each participant in the time-based condition executed their 
intention, i.e. called the experimenter at the pre-arranged time.       
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On the seventh day, when participants telephoned the experimenter, the time of 
their call was automatically noted. Participants who were late were questioned about the 
reasons for their late call. At the end, the experimenter arranged a meeting with the 
participants for them to return the diary and to receive a full debrief and course credits. 
Results 
All 43 participants completed the study, however, three participants did not attend 
their final meeting and thus never returned their diaries. Out of 40 participants who did 
return their diaries, 19 were in the time-based condition and 21 in the event-based 
condition. However, initial screening of the data revealed one outlier in the event-based 
condition with 31 entries that constituted 19% of recorded rehearsals in that condition. 
The data of this participant was excluded from the analyses, and the final sample 
consisted of 19 participants in the time- and 20 participants in the event-based condition. 
 Like in Study 1, none of the participants forgot completely to make the telephone 
call. In the time-based condition, 10 participants (53%) remembered to call within 10 
minutes of critical time and 9 participants (47%) were more than 10 minutes late. Of 
these, four remembered to call after 10 minutes but within one hour from critical time and 
five were late for more than one hour with the latest call being made at midnight. Only 
one of these participants said he remembered on time but was unable to call. The 
remaining 8 participants all admitted forgetting and remembering at a later time. 
In the event based condition, 16 participants (80%) responded on time (i.e., made 
the call within 10 minutes of seeing the text message on their mobile phone) and only 4 
participants (20%) were late in replying to the text message. Of these, three called within 
an hour and one called after 1 hour and 10 minutes from receiving the text message. In 
contrast to the time-based condition, none of these 4 participants indicated that their late 
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responses were caused by forgetting. Instead, they provided valid reasons as to why they 
were unable to read the target message (and call back) immediately after receiving it.   
Therefore, when taking into account participants’ self-reports, performance in the 
event-based condition was at ceiling with 100% of prospective memory responses classed 
as HITs whereas in the time-based condition 58% of responses (N=11) were classed as 
HITS. This difference in the percentage of on-time responses in two conditions was 
highly significant (χ2=8.19, df=1, p<.005, with Yate’s correction applied). This finding 
replicates the results of Sellen et al.’s (1997) naturalistic study in which participants were 
better at remembering to press the electronic device when they were in a particular 
location (event-based task) than when they had to carry out this action at particular times 
(time-based task) (for similar findings see also Rendell & Craik, 2000, Experiment 2). 
Number and distribution of rehearsals as a function of task 
 In total, 19 participants in the time-based condition recorded 178 rehearsals (range 
3-22), and 20 participants in the event-based condition -135 rehearsals (range 2-14). In 
line with our prediction, the mean number or recorded rehearsals in the time-based 
condition (M=9.37, SD=5.12) was reliably higher than in the event-based condition 
(M=6.75, SD=3.27) (t=1.91, df=37, p=.03, one tailed).  
The distribution of these rehearsals over the 7-day period is presented in Figure 3. 
Visual inspection of the figure suggests that the distribution of rehearsals differed 
between the conditions in the predicted direction with the mean number of rehearsals 
increasing markedly on the last two days of the study in the time-based but not in the 
event-based condition. However, when the means were entered into a 2 (prospective 
memory task) x 7 (days) mixed ANOVA with the repeated measures on the last factor the 
task by days interaction was not significant (F(6, 222)= 1.10, MSe=.76, p=.36). 
Nonetheless, we conducted further tests of simple main effects to examine the effect of 
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the task on each day of the study. This was deemed acceptable given our strong a priori 
prediction as well as the large number of degrees of freedom, and the similar shape of 
distribution between the conditions (except the last day of the study) that would 
negatively affect the chances of detecting a significant interaction (see McClelland & 
Judd, 1993). These tests showed that the only significant difference between the 
conditions occurred on the last, seventh day of the study (F(1,37)=6.31, MSe=1.23, 
p=.017, η 2 =.14). Participants in the time-based condition recorded almost twice as many 
rehearsals (M=1.84, SD=1.34) than those in the event-based condition (M=.95, SD=.83). 
Furthermore, like in Study 1 and 2, the number of recorded rehearsals in the time-
based condition was positively correlated with prospective memory performance 
(r(18)=.50, p=.04). This correlation could not be calculated for the event-based condition 
due to a near ceiling performance in that group.  
Effect of task on types of reported triggers 
 For this analysis, the descriptions of triggers provided by participants for their 
recorded rehearsals were categorised by two independent raters (the first author and the 
research student) using exactly the same procedure as in Study 1 and 2. Agreement 
between the raters was excellent (Kappa=.93, SE=.03) and some minor disagreements 
were solved by discussion. The mean number of rehearsals as a function of prospective 
memory task and 4 trigger categories (no trigger, incidental external, incidental internal, 
self-initiated planning) are presented in Table 2 (Panel C).  
These means were entered into a 2 (task) x 4 (trigger) mixed ANOVA with the 
repeated measures on the last factor. This analysis resulted in the main effect of triggers 
(F(3,111)=23.73, MSe=4.49, p<.001, η 2 =.39). However, this effect was qualified by a 
significant interaction with the type of task (F(3,111)=2.93, p=.047, η 2 =.07).  The tests 
of simple main effects showed that participants in the time-based condition had 
                                                                   Time-based Prospective Remembering 37 
significantly higher number of rehearsals in the no trigger category (M=4.37, SD= 3.08) 
than those in the event-based condition (M=2.15, SD=1.66) (F(1,37)=7.96, MSe=6.03, 
p=.008, η 2 =.18). Although participants in the time-based condition had higher number of 
rehearsals in the self-initiated category (M=.53), SD=.84) than those in the event-based 
condition (M=.20, SD=.41), this difference was not significant (F(1,37)=2.41, MSe=.43, 
p=.12). There was also no significant difference between the conditions in terms of the 
number of rehearsals in the incidental external and incidental internal categories (Fs<1).  
Ongoing activities and concentration ratings as a function of task  
 Finally, we examined the activities that participants were engaged in when they 
reported rehearsals and the ratings of concentration on these tasks. In Study 1 young 
participants were more likely to report being engaged in the automatic than controlled 
activities at the time of rehearsals (in 62% and 38% of cases, respectively). However, in 
Study 2 young participants were equally likely to report to be engaged in the automatic 
and controlled activities (in 54% and 46% of cases, respectively). It was therefore 
interesting to see if the pattern of findings obtained in Study 2 would be replicated in 
Study 3 in time- and event-based conditions. 
 Two raters independently read the descriptions of activities provided by 
participants and classed them as automatic or controlled using the same coding criteria as 
in Study 1 and 2. Agreement between the raters was high and any disagreements were 
solved by discussion (Kappa=.91, SE=.04). Out of 178 descriptions provided by 
participants in the time-based condition, 53% of cases (N=95) were classed as automatic 
and 47% (N=83) as controlled. In the event-based condition, 49.6% of reported activities 
(N=67) were classed as automatic, and 50.4% (N=68) as controlled.  Thus, the activities 
were equally likely to be classed as automatic and controlled and there was no significant 
difference between the time- and event-based conditions in this respect (χ2<1). There was 
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also no significant difference between the two conditions in terms of the percentage of 
activities that were rated by participants as requiring low (ratings 1 and 2), medium 
(rating 3) and high (ratings 4 and 5) concentration as shown in Table 5 (χ2<1). Although 
participants in time-and event-based condition were equally likely to report being 
engaged in automatic and controlled activities they rated their concentration to be high on 
only one third of occasions (34%). Rest of the times they reported low (38%) and 
medium (28%) levels of concentration. This pattern of results fully replicated those 
obtained on young participants in Study 2. 
Discussion 
 In summary, the results seem to replicate findings on young sample in Study 2 
and also extend our knowledge about time-based prospective memory by examining 
possible differences and/or similarities between the latter and a comparable event-based 
task. Despite important changes in methodology (e.g., diaries being kept for equal 
number of hours each day and the last day of the study being a weekday rather than 
Sunday), the results showed that the number or recorded rehearsals did increase on the 
last day of the study in the time-based condition. In line with our prediction, no such 
increase was present in the event-based condition.  
Somewhat surprisingly, in both conditions, participants recorded significantly 
more rehearsals on the first day of the study than on subsequent days and in the time-
based condition the number of recorded rehearsals on the first and the last day of the 
study was identical (F<1). In other words, instead of the J-shaped pattern there was a U-
shaped pattern in the time-based condition, and instead of the predicted flat line there was 
an inverted J-shaped pattern in the event-based condition.  
The U-shaped pattern has also been obtained in the study of Ceci and 
Bronfenbrenner (1985) in which children had to remember to remove cup cakes from an 
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oven or re-charge the batteries in 30 minutes time while simultaneously playing a video 
game. According to Ceci and Bronfenbrenner (1985) the increased monitoring in the first 
five minutes of the delay period helped children to calibrate their internal clocks with the 
time shown on the real clock. However, in the present study with a delay period of 7 days 
there did not seem to be a need for calibrating internal clock especially in the event-based 
condition.  Instead, it appears that the heightened number of rehearsals on the first day may 
have been due to the changes in methodology, i.e., that participants had to start recording 
only from the morning of the following day after their initial meeting with the experimenter.  
Furthermore, our results showed that although participants reported significantly 
more rehearsals in the time-based condition, the percentage of correct HIT responses was 
significantly lower in the time- than in the event-based condition. This pattern of findings 
fully replicates the results of Sellen et al.’s (1997) naturalistic study and supports the 
idea, repeatedly expressed in the literature, that event-based tasks with distinctive targets 
are easier to remember than time-based tasks.  
However, the most important finding that emerged from the study concerns the 
nature of triggers that elicit the rehearsals in the time-and event-based conditions. Thus, 
in both conditions the rehearsals triggered by self-initiated planning thoughts were 
recorded least often (on only 6% and 3% of cases, respectively) and there was no reliable 
difference between the conditions in terms of mean number of such rehearsals. In line 
with our predictions, the major difference between the time- and event-based prospective 
memory lies in the number of recorded rehearsals with no apparent triggers. This finding 
suggests that the representations of time-based tasks may be activated at a higher level 
during the delay period than those of the event-based tasks and has important 
implications for our understanding of the mechanisms involved in the remembering of 
time-based prospective memory tasks.  
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General Discussion 
 Prospective memory research has been mainly focused on event-based 
prospective memory. There are very few studies that have specifically examined the 
processes involved in remembering time-based tasks. The present paper fills this gap by 
examining the nature of thought processes that bring the time-based intention to mind in 
both young and old participants, and how these processes differ from those involved in 
remembering event-based tasks.  
 It has been assumed that the successful retrieval of time-based tasks depends on 
periodic rehearsal of intention especially during a period immediately preceding the 
critical time. This is reflected in the J-shaped pattern of rehearsals during the delay 
interval as shown by the results of a few laboratory studies on time-based prospective 
memory (e.g., Einstein et al., 1995; Harris & Wilkins, 1982; Park et al., 1997; see also 
Ceci & Bronfenbrenner, 1985 who obtained the U-shaped pattern). Furthermore, given 
that there is no external event to signal that the time for the execution of intention has 
arrived, it has been assumed that this periodic rehearsal or reminding is mediated by 
deliberate retrieval processes that are instigated by participants themselves (e.g., ‘what do 
I need to do next?’ ‘what are my plans for today?’, etc.). Since laboratory studies have 
mostly utilised very short time delays (in the order of few minutes) it is quite likely that 
participants do keep the task in mind for the entire delay period and occasionally check 
the time when they think that sufficient time has elapsed (cf. Harris & Wilkins, 1982; 
Sellen et al., 1997). In this sense the retrieval processes in short-term laboratory tasks can 
be regarded as self-initiated and deliberate.  
 However, it is unlikely that the remembering of time-based tasks in everyday life 
with long delay intervals of several hours or days occur in a similar fashion. It is obvious 
that after forming an intention to do something at a particular time in the future, people 
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have to focus on other tasks that require their immediate attention. Nevertheless, thoughts 
about the task may occasionally enter their mind throughout the delay interval. For 
example, participants in our studies did report thinking about their future task to call the 
experimenter (cf. Ellis & Nimmo-Smith, 1993). The primary goal of the present 
investigation was to find out whether these thoughts were instigated by the self-initiated 
planning processes or were triggered by incidental external and/or internal cues. 
The nature of retrieval in time-based prospective memory 
 The results from all three studies clearly show that self-initiated rehearsals, 
occurring when people are engaged in deliberate planning of their daily activities, were 
reported on very few occasions by both young and old participants. The mean number of 
such rehearsals varied from .50 to 1.70 during the 7-day long delay period (comprising 
6% to 15% of recorded cases) and was significantly lower than rehearsals triggered by 
incidental cues in the environment or by one's own thoughts. The examination of these 
incidental triggers showed that there was a great variety of cues that could act as triggers 
with some cues being completely unrelated to the content of the to-be-performed task 
(see Tables 1a and 1b for examples).  
 This finding confirms the informal feedback provided in some earlier studies. For 
example, one third of the participants in the Harris and Wilkins (1982) study indicated 
that references to time in the film they were watching (e.g., shorts of airport clock, plane 
departure times, etc.) reminded them of the time-based task they were supposed to be 
carrying out (see also Sellen et al., 1997).  However, Harris and Wilkins (1982) report 
that references to time were difficult to determine objectively. When three independent 
raters were asked to watch the film and record any references to time the consistency 
between the raters was so low that it discouraged any further analyses. This indicates that 
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only when one forms a future intention one becomes sensitive to incidental external cues 
that are not otherwise easily noticeable to people who do not hold such intention. 
 Perhaps most surprisingly, the largest number of rehearsals (at least in Study 2 
and 3) was reported to have occurred without any external or internal incidental cues, i.e., 
they just seemed to pop into one’s head without any apparent reason.  Since participants 
did not seem to exercise any control over these spontaneously occurring rehearsals it is 
difficult to regard them as self-initiated (i.e., mediated by deliberate effortful retrieval 
processes). How do these findings fit existing models of time-based prospective memory?  
 The Random Walk model does not ascribe any active properties to the 
representation of to-be-performed intention. Periodic rehearsal and ultimately the retrieval 
of intention at an appropriate time are entirely determined by random incidental cues in 
one's environment or thoughts (Wilkins, 1979, cited in Harris, 1984). Although our study 
showed that such "accidental" cued rehearsals did indeed occur fairly frequently they were 
by no means the only type of rehearsals experienced by participants. On the whole, it 
appears that the obtained results are more in line with the Test-Wait-Test-Exit model as 
originally proposed by Harris and Wilkins (1982). According to this model, the successful 
performance is mediated by a series of Test-Wait-Test loops (the test being synonymous 
with the rehearsal), especially towards the end of the delay period, until a final test is made 
within the appropriate critical period which is then followed by successful execution of an 
intention signifying Exit from the TWT loops. The pattern of rehearsals observed in the 
present study is generally in agreement with this model. Most importantly, the results of 
the present study extend the Harris and Wilkins model by providing the missing 
information about the processes that elicit the tests (i.e., rehearsals) in the delay period. 8 
In particular, our results suggest that the representation of intention formed when 
one decides to carry out a time-based task at some point in the future is likely to remain 
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activated at subthreshold level, possibly during the entire delay period (see also Ellis, 1996 
and Mäntylä, 1996 for a similar view). Moreover, this sustained subthreshold activation 
appears to periodically reach levels that result in conscious thoughts about the intention 
(i.e., non-cued rehearsals when intention pops into mind without any apparent cues). In 
addition, it may sensitise people to chance encounters with incidental cues that would not 
necessarily be perceived as related to the task without having this intention (see Table 1a, 
for examples).9 These periodic conscious thoughts about the task may, in turn, serve an 
important function of further reactivating the representation of intention during the 
retention interval, increasing the chances that it will eventually be remembered at the 
appropriate moment which may be hours or even days ahead (see also Ellis, 1996, and 
Freemen & Ellis, 2003). The positive role of such rehearsals was revealed by the results of 
all three studies on young participants showing significant positive correlations between 
the number of recorded rehearsals and the probability of on-time prospective memory 
response in the time-based task.  
Theoretically, rehearsals that spontaneously pop into mind without any cues are 
most interesting as they may hold a key to performance success in everyday (and possibly 
laboratory) prospective memory tasks.  Given that the likelihood of encountering relevant 
incidental external cues or instigating conscious planning thoughts during the critical time 
period is probably not very high, the successful retrieval of time-based tasks may 
ultimately depend on these thoughts about the task that occur without any apparent 
triggers. The importance of such non-cued thoughts is emphasised by the findings of both 
Study 2 and 3 showing that participants recorded a significantly higher number of such 
rehearsals in comparison to all other trigger categories (incidental external, incidental 
internal and self-initiated planning). In addition, when we separately examined the relation 
between the rehearsals in each of these trigger categories and the probability of HIT 
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response, the significant correlations emerged for only non-cued (r(33)=.35, p=.04) and 
self-initiated (r(33)=.34, p=.046) rehearsals in Study 2 and for non-cued rehearsals in 
Study 3 (r(18)=.46, p=.047). Although these initial findings need to be treated cautiously 
they do suggest an interesting idea that the activation levels of everyday long-term 
intentions can be measured by the number of non-cued rehearsals occurring in the delay 
interval. 
 Another interesting point in relation to these non-cued rehearsals is that they 
imply the existence of some kind of internal (and subconscious) counter or clock 
which ensures that the intention is not only occasionally brought to mind during the 
delay interval, but also nearer the critical time (cf. Einstein & McDaniel, 1996a; 
1996b; Harris & Wilkins, 1982). The results of the present study provide some initial 
support for this idea. For example, although the mean number of reported rehearsals 
significantly increased in the last day of the task, the actual numbers were not 
particularly high with a range of 0 to 5 rehearsals and a mean of 1.84 (see Figure 3). 
Neither were these rehearsals recorded predominantly in the final hour immediately 
preceding the pre-arranged time for the phone call (cf. Sellen et al., 1997). In all three 
studies, only 30% of rehearsals recorded on the final day of the task were recorded in 
the hour immediately preceding the critical time. It is therefore unlikely that 
participants would have succeeded in calling the experimenter on time without the 
operation of this internal clock that would bring the task to one’s mind near the 
critical time and thus, eliminate the necessity of excessive time-checking. 
 It is interesting that a similar subconscious clock may be in operation when one 
needs to wake up unusually early (e.g., at 5:00 am). Everyday observations and some 
empirical evidence seem to suggest that people often succeed in this seemingly 
impossible task. For example, in one large scale questionnaire study (N=1080), 53% of 
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respondents reported that they could sometimes wake up from sleep at a particular self-
chosen time (Fraisse, 1964, p. 44). In a laboratory study of Zung and Wilson (1971), 
participants were indeed able to wake up within ±10 minutes of the designated target 
times, set between 02:00 and 05:00 a.m., on 32% of occasions. This level of 
performance is well above chance and is comparable to conscious time estimations of 
similar durations obtained by Webb and Ross (1972) in awake participants (see Block, 
1979 for further discussion). It is also interesting that the successful awakenings were 
independent of pre-selected times and the stage of sleep participants were in 
immediately before waking up (for similar findings, see Tart, 1970).    
 An important question for future research is to examine a precise mechanism of 
this internal clock that can bring up the time-based intention to consciousness both 
during sleep (as described above) and waking hours (as shown in the present study). 10 It 
is unlikely that this clock is mediated primarily by biological factors such as circadian 
periodicity in activation levels or physiological rhythms during normal sleep (in case of 
waking up at pre-selected time). Tart (1970), for example, argues that these rhythms 
usually last longer than 60 minutes and would be unable to account for performance 
requiring precise responding in minutes rather than hours (cf. Zakay & Block, 1997). 
 On the other hand, Block (1979) argues that the operation of this clock is 
mediated by “subconscious (dissociated) information-processing mechanisms” (p. 
200). However, current theories of time estimation (especially prospective time 
estimation) are primarily based on studies in which participants have to estimate very 
brief time intervals in the order of few seconds (Allan, 1998; Block & Zakay,1997; 
Grondin, 2001; Zakay & Block, 1997). It is therefore unclear whether they can 
account for the operation of an internal clock in time-based prospective memory tasks 
with delay intervals of hours, days and weeks (but see Block & Zakay, in press). 
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 It is, of course, possible that current theories of time-estimation are more 
relevant and useful to account for time-based prospective memory studied in the 
laboratory, particularly as they use shorter time intervals (typically, from 1 to 10 
minutes). However, preliminary results from Mäntylä and Carelli (in press) show that 
participants’ prospective time-estimation was not related to time-monitoring 
frequency and performance in a laboratory time-based prospective memory task. It is 
obvious that more research needs to be conducted in future to address these issues.  
Present findings, together with the earlier results of Zung and Wilson (1970) on 
waking at pre-arranged times, open up interesting avenues for fruitful collaboration 
and cross fertilization of currently disparate areas of time estimation and prospective 
memory. It appears that the Zeitgeist for such an endeavour has already arrived (see 
e.g., Glicksohn & Myslobodsky, in press). 
Is time-based prospective memory different from event-based prospective memory? 
Overall, the results of all three studies suggest that the rehearsal and retrieval of 
naturalistic time-based tasks is less self-initiated and more reliant on automatic processes 
than previously thought. Moreover, the results of Study 3 showed that the retrieval of 
time- and event-based tasks is not mediated by fundamentally different processes. Indeed, 
thoughts about the task occurred via three different routes in both time- and event-based 
conditions (i.e., rehearsals instigated by incidental external or internal cues, by self-
initiated planning thoughts or by no apparent triggers). These results suggest that the 
difference between the time- and event-based tasks is more quantitative than qualitative. 
In particular, the representations of event-based tasks may generally be at a relatively 
constant and low level of subthreshold activation. This level of activation is sufficient to 
sensitise one towards the occurrence of target and/or related events in the environment. 
However, it may not be enough for the task to pop periodically into one's mind, at least 
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with the same frequency as in the case of time-based tasks. In contrast, the activation 
levels of time-based tasks may be higher and fluctuate over time resulting in periodic 
conscious thoughts about the task.  
It is encouraging that additional support for this idea comes from a recent 
(unpublished) laboratory study of the Intention Superiority Effect in which reaction times 
were faster to intention related contents if participants expected to retrieve these contents 
in a subsequent time-based than event-based task (Freeman & Ellis, 2002, September). It 
is interesting, however, that in this experiment, as well as in Study 3, the event-based task 
had a relatively salient distinctive target that reduced the necessity for its representation 
to reach high levels of activation. Future laboratory and diary studies will need to 
compare the activation levels of time-based tasks to that of event-based tasks with a less 
distinctive target event. It is possible that in these circumstances the activation levels of 
event-based tasks will be comparable to those of time-based tasks. 
Increased accessibility of time- and event-based prospective memory tasks  
Results of the present study also provide evidence in support of the idea that both 
time- and event-based tasks may have increased accessibility in comparison to other 
(retrospective) memory representations in long-term memory. For example, in recent 
diary studies of Kvavilashvili and Mandler (2004, Study 4) and Schlagman, Kvavilashvili 
and Schulz (in press) on involuntary autobiographical memories, participants reported 
low levels of concentration (i.e., points 1 and 2 on the 5-point rating scale) on ongoing 
activities in 55% and 60% of cases, respectively. However, these percentages were 
significantly lower in Study 2 and 3 of the present investigation (between 35.5% to 40%, 
see Table 4 and 5).  The differences across the studies indicate to the interesting 
possibility that, due to their functional importance, thoughts about the time- and event-
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based tasks are more likely to occur when engaged in relatively demanding controlled 
activities than involuntary (retrospective) autobiographical memories.  
 Further evidence in support of this idea comes from the results concerning the 
effects of age on the number of reported rehearsals. Previous research indicates that 
with increased age there may be a general tendency to experience less number of 
spontaneous mental processes irrespective of their content. For example, Giambra 
(1989) found that in comparison to a young group, older adults (60+ years old) 
reported up to 50% fewer involuntary task unrelated thoughts during a monotonous 
vigilance task in the laboratory. Similarly, older adults have reported experiencing 
less number of involuntary autobiographical memories and involuntary mind pops 
than young adults in the study of Schlagman et al., (in press) and Kvavilashvili and 
Mandler, (2001, July), respectively. These findings are in sharp contrast with the 
results of the present study showing that, in everyday life, old participants did not 
record less number of thoughts about the prospective memory task than young 
participants. Future studies should directly compare involuntary autobiographical 
memories and thoughts about prospective memory tasks within the same samples of 
young and old participants both in terms of the number of experienced memories and 
the ratings of  concentration on ongoing activities. 
Prospective memory and aging paradox 
 Another set of interesting findings obtained in this study concern the effects of 
age, intrinsic motivation, and ongoing activity on time-based prospective memory. Old 
participants were as good as young participants in carrying out the time-based task on 
time. This is in line with previous findings showing either no age effect (e.g., 
Moscovitch, 1982; West, 1988; Study 1) or reliable age effects in favour of older adults 
(Devolder, Brigham, & Pressley, 1990; Martin, 1986; Rendell & Thompson, 1999; 
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Rendell & Craik, 2000; d’Ydewalle, 1996). It has been suggested that outside the 
laboratory old people may perform as well as young people (if not better) because they 
use external reminders more efficiently (i.e., calendars, post-it-notes, etc.) than young 
people (Martin, 1986; Moscovitch, 1982). In addition, Maylor (1998) has suggested that 
in order to achieve the same level of performance as young people older adults may need 
to think about (rehearse) the task more frequently (cf. Rendell & Craik, 2000). However, 
in the present study all participants were actively discouraged from using any external 
mnemonic aids. Nor did the older sample report thinking about the task more frequently 
than the young sample (for similar findings see Costermans & Desmette, 1999; Patton & 
Meit, 1993; Experiment 1). There were also no age effects in the types of rehearsals 
recorded by participants.  
 However, age effects were obtained in self-rated levels of motivation and the type 
of ongoing activities people were engaged in at the time of rehearsal. Older adults 
reported to have reliably higher levels of (intrinsic) motivation both before and after the 
completion of the task than younger adults. On the other hand, although old participants 
were more likely to be engaged in seemingly automatic activities at the time of reported 
rehearsals they were also more likely to be concentrating on these activities which were 
apparently attentionally more demanding for them (cf. Lindenberger et al., 2000). Taken 
together, these results provide some insights into possible reasons for obtaining 
paradoxical findings in prospective memory and aging research concerning significant 
age effects in the laboratory (especially with time-based tasks) and no age effects or 
superior performance of older adults outside the laboratory.  
 It appears that successful performance on time-based prospective memory tasks 
may be partly mediated by a certain combination of one's level of motivation to carry out 
the task and the nature of ongoing task which can be attentionally undemanding (i.e., 
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automatic) or demanding (controlled). Previous studies have shown that prospective 
memory performance is affected by both motivation and attentional demands of ongoing 
activity. Higher levels of motivation (i.e., interest, incentives, etc.) improve performance 
(see e.g., Kliegel, et al., 2001; Kvavilashvili, 1987), and attentionally demanding ongoing 
tasks impair it (e.g., Einstein, Smith, McDaniel, & Shaw, 1997; Marsh & Hicks, 1998).  
 Our study shows that older adults report being more highly motivated than 
younger adults to carry out prospective memory tasks in a timely fashion (for similar 
findings see Patton & Meit, 1993). However, outside the laboratory, in their everyday life 
they are generally involved in relatively automatic habitual activities even though they 
may find some of these fairly demanding. Therefore, the combination of high motivation 
and relatively undemanding and familiar ongoing tasks may result in prospective memory 
performance that is comparable or even better than that of young adults. In the laboratory, 
however, although old participants may continue to be more highly motivated than young 
participants they are usually asked to perform tasks that are unfamiliar and cognitively 
demanding. 11 The overall result is that performance levels of older adults may drop both 
in terms of the number of clock checks and on-time responses. 
 This line of argument implies that age effects may be eliminated in the laboratory 
if participants are engaged in fairly undemanding and familiar activities such as watching 
a film on TV. Few studies that have used watching a film as an ongoing activity in the 
laboratory have indeed found no significant age effects either in performance or in the 
number of clock checks (e.g., Costermans & Desmette, 1999; d’Ydewalle, 1996; Patton 
& Meit, 1993, Experiment 1). Therefore, future laboratory studies of prospective memory 
and aging will need to manipulate the level of familiarity of ongoing tasks and motivation 
in order to examine these ideas in more depth. 
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Some methodological considerations and conclusions 
 Finally, a couple of methodological issues need to be considered in relation to a 
diary method used in the present study. First, the overall compliance rate was good as on 
average participants recorded between 8.38 and 13.17 rehearsals in the time-based task 
across the three studies. In addition, most of the rehearsals (70%) were recorded within 
an hour after experiencing them and therefore it was less likely that participants would 
have forgotten some crucial details of their rehearsal experience (cf. Ericsson & Simon, 
1980). Second, it was also less likely that some participants were consistently under-
recording the instances of experienced rehearsals. If this were the case we would not have 
obtained a positive correlation between the number of rehearsals and prospective memory 
performance (HIT vs. LATE). Furthermore, although on some occasions participants 
were probably unable to notice subtle cues in their environment or thoughts (e.g., see 
Bowers, Farvolden & Lambros, 1995), it is less likely that the majority of reported 
rehearsals with no triggers would fall into this category. Thus, on the whole, participants 
were quite willing to describe the triggers for recorded rehearsals and the descriptions of 
these triggers would often bear very little semantic relation to the prospective memory 
task (e.g., see idiosyncratic cues in Tables 1a and 1b) 
In conclusion, the present study has provided new insights into the processes and 
mechanisms that are involved in remembering time-based prospective memory tasks in 
everyday life. It has enabled us to further develop the TWTE model of Harris and 
Wilkins (1982) and to make crucial comparisons between processes involved in 
remembering naturalistic time- and event-based tasks. Most importantly, the study has 
generated several interesting avenues for future research and shows that the diary method 
is a useful and reliable method for collecting this type of naturalistic data (cf. Berntsen, 
1998; Ellis & Nimmo-Smith, 1993; Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004).  
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Footnotes 
 
 1 This applies even to the attentional/strategic monitoring view. The hallmark 
of this model is that one monitors the environment for the occurrence of the target 
event. It is, however, impossible to assume that in case of time-based task one 
constantly monitors the environment (i.e., the clock) for the critical time. 
 2 In some studies a U-shaped curve has been obtained (see e.g., Ceci & 
Bronfenbrenner, 1985). 
 3 Although 327 rehearsals were recorded in total, on 7 occasions the activity 
was not specified, hence the number of cases for this analysis was 320. 
 4 In this and all subsequent analyses of variance with repeated measures, if the 
sphericity assumption was violated the reported probability levels were adjusted 
accordingly (Greenhouse-Geisser corrections).  
 5 Similar findings have emerged in research on other forms of involuntary 
cognitions such as task unrelated images and thoughts (TUITS; Giambra, 1995), 
involuntary autobiographical memories (Berntsen, 1998) and involuntary semantic 
memories or mind-popping (Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004). 
 6 There was a marginally significant age effect on the average number of hours 
awake during the week (F(1,67)=3.76, MSe= 1.60, p=.057) with older people 
reporting being awake slightly longer (M=16.55, SD=1.30)  than young people 
(M=15.96, SD=1.22).  
 7 Although a total of 868 rehearsals were recorded, on two occasions in the young 
group and on three occasions in the old group activity descriptions were not provided, 
hence, 863 cases. 
 
                                                                   Time-based Prospective Remembering 63 
 
 8 As pointed out in the introduction, the TWTE model, as formulated by 
Harris and Wilkins (1982), was fairly open about the possible processes that may 
instigate periodic tests. It was only in subsequent studies that tests were assumed to be 
instigated by self-initiated, attentionally demanding monitoring processes. 
 9 It is interesting that a similar account is put forward by Yaniv and Meyer 
(1987) for the processes involved in the phenomenon of incubation, i.e., when a 
solution to a problem suddenly pops into mind much later, after one has abandoned 
solving the problem and switched to other unrelated activities. According to their 
memory-sensitization hypothesis  “the initial unsuccessful attempt to solve a problem 
may partially activate stored, but currently inaccessible, memory traces critical to the 
problem’s solution. Then, during a subsequent intervening period of other endeavors, 
the activation may sensitize a person to chance encounters with related external 
stimuli that raise the critical traces above threshold and trigger their integration with 
other available information”(p. 200). 
 10 It is interesting that one old participant in Study 2, who had to call the 
experimenter at 9:30 a.m. on Sunday, reported waking up from sleep at 4:10 a.m. and 
7:35 a.m. with the thought about having to make a phone call.   
 11 Even when performance levels in ongoing laboratory tasks are matched in 
young and old participants, it does not mean that old participants would not need to 
put more effort into the cognitive task than young participants (Eysenck & Calvo, 
1992). 
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Table 1a    
 
Numbers and Percentages of Different Types of External Cues Recorded by Participants  
 
in Study 1 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Content of the External Cue                                                                                  (N)     %  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
(1)   Cues related to phones and phoning                                                              (45)   31%          
        (e.g., phone ringing, seeing a phone or a phone number, someone  
        mentioning a phone call/phone number, wake up calls in B&B,  making  
        a phone call,  checking calls on the answer phone) 
(2)   Cues related to diaries                                                                                   (31)   21%    
        (e.g., seeing an experimental diary,  personal diary, calendar, reminder  
        note, other diaries in a shop, someone mentioned diaries) 
(3)   Cues related to the actual study/experiment                                                  (27)   18%    
        (e.g., seeing the research participation form, the word 'forgot', chapter  
        title "Building blocks of thought", hearing the words 'task analysis',                 
        someone talking about thoughts, research credits) 
(4)   Cues related to time                                                                                       (21)  14.3%  
         (looking at/seeing a clock, watch, hearing/setting an alarm, coming                   
         across the word 'week', 'time', friend said he would visit on Sunday)   
(5)   People or places act as a reminder                                                                 (12)   8.2%  
        (e.g., seeing someone who looked like the experimenter, in the same 
        room when first met the experimenter) 
(6)   Idiosyncratic cues that were seemingly unrelated to the task                        (11)  7.5%  
       (e.g., seeing Christmas food, the word "boring", computer, a good  
       looking girl, the police arriving, having cold feet)  
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Table 1b  
Numbers and Percentages of Different Types of Internal Cues Recorded by Participants  
 
in Study 1 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Content of the Internal Cue                                                                                  (N)      %     
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
(1)   Thinking of future plans, planning                                                             (29)    29%     
       (e.g., thinking of plans for Sunday, plans in general, plans for today)                                                                                                                                                          
(2)   Thinking of other intentions and tasks                                                        (30)    30%    
       (e.g., thinking/reminding oneself to give a phone  call to someone, 
       to post a letter or to buy toothpaste, deciding what time to have a lunch, 
       putting off doing a lab report) 
(3)   Thinking of work and university                                                                 (16)    16% 
        (e.g., thinking about  projects, labs, stats lecture, essay question on 
        cognition, courses taught at the university and college) 
(4) Thinking about things related to the study/experiment                                (10)   10%     
        (e.g., " what was my son's train of thoughts?", questionnaire that was  
         filled in, motivation, memory lecture)  
(5)   Thinking about experimental diary                                                                (4)     4%     
(6)  Thinking about time, timetables, deadlines/dates                                           (5)    5%     
(7)  Thinking about what happened today or yesterday                                         (4)    4%   
(8)  Any other thought                                                                                            (2)    2%   
     (e.g., feeling frustration, a ringing tone in my head) 
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Table 2   
Mean Number of Recorded Rehearsals as a Function of Trigger Type (No Trigger vs. 
Incidental External vs. Incidental Internal vs. Self-Initiated) in Study 1 (Panel A), as a 
Function of Trigger Type and Age (Young vs. Old) in Study 2 (Panel B), and as a 
Function of Trigger Type and Prospective Memory Task (Time- vs. Event-Based) in 
Study 3 (Panel C). Standard Deviations in Brackets. 
(Panel A) Study 1 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                         Trigger  Category  
             ________________________________________________________________ 
 
                     No triggers                Incidental  Triggers                 Self-Initiated Planning      
 
                                                  External               Internal                  Thoughts                                            
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
                         2.10                     3.77                      1.79                          .72 
                       
                        (3.22)                  (3.33)                    (1.67)                      (1.12)                
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
(Panel B) Study 2 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                        Trigger  Category  
              ________________________________________________________________ 
 
                     No triggers               Incidental  Triggers                 Self-Initiated Planning      
 
                                                  External                Internal                  Thoughts                                            
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Young              4.32                     3.06                      2.44                        1.70 
                       
                        (3.56)                  (2.39)                   (2.35)                      (2.55) 
 
 
Old                   6.22                     3.66                      2.17                        1.11 
                        (5.30)                  (3.16)                    (2.08)                     (1.75) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
(Panel C) Study 3 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                   T r i g g e r  C a t e g o r y  
                       
              ________________________________________________________________ 
 
                     No triggers                  Incidental  Triggers                 Self-initiated Planning      
 
                                                 External                Internal                  Thoughts                                            
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Time-based      4.37                     3.26                     1.21                          .53 
                       
                        (3.08)                  (2.84)                   (1.91)                       (.83) 
 
 
Event-based     2.15                     3.40                      1.00                         .20 
 
                        (5.30)                  (2.37)                   (1.17)                       (.41)              
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3  
 
Means of Self-Rated Motivation to Make a Phone Call on Sunday as a Function of Age  
 
(Young vs. Old) and the Time of Rating (Before vs. After the Study) in Study 2. Ratings  
 
were Made on a 5-Point Scale (1=Not Motivated, 3=Moderately Motivated, 5=Very  
 
Motivated). Standard Deviations in Brackets. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                                      Motivation Ratings 
                                         ___________________________________________________ 
 
                                                 Before the study                  After the study 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Young                                             3.70 (.92)                           3.39 (.93) 
 
Old                                                  4.39 (.73)                           4.22 (.72) 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4    
 
Numbers and Percentages of Recorded Rehearsals in Study 2 as a Function of Age  
 
(Young vs. Old) and Self-Reported Level of Concentration on the Ongoing Activity  
 
(Low vs. Medium vs. High). Concentration was Rated on a 5-Point Scale (1=Not  
 
Concentrating at all, 5=Fully Concentrating). Ratings 1 and 2 were Classed as Low, 3  
 
as Medium and 4 and 5 as High Levels of Concentration. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                            Level o f Concentration   
                               ________________________________________________________ 
 
                                       Low                    Medium                   High                  Total  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Young                            158                         97                         138                     393 
                                     (40%)                     (25%)                    (35%)               (100%)  
 
Old                                 144                        116                         213                    473 
                                     (30%)                     (25%)                    (45%)               (100%) 
 
Total                               302                        213                        351                     866* 
                                     (35%)                     (25%)                    (40%)               (100%) 
_______________________________________________________________________  
 
* Although a total of 868 rehearsals were recorded, on two occasions (one in young and  
 
one in old group) concentration rating was omitted, hence, 866 cases.  
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Table 5 
 
Numbers and Percentages of Recorded Rehearsals in Study 3 as a Function of Condition  
 
(Time- vs. Event-Based) and Self-Reported Level of Concentration on the Ongoing  
 
Activity (Low vs. Medium vs. High). Concentration was Rated on a 5-Point Scale  
 
(1=Not Concentrating at all, 5=Fully Concentrating). Ratings 1 and 2 were Classed as  
 
Low, 3 as Medium and 4 and 5 as High Levels of Concentration. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                           Level of Concentration   
                               ________________________________________________________ 
 
                                       Low                    Medium                   High                  Total  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Time-Based                     72                          47                           59                      178 
                                      (40%)                    (26%)                     (33%)                 (100%)  
 
Event-Based                    45                          41                           48                      134 
                                     (35.5%)                 (30.5%)                   (35%)                (100%) 
 
Total                               117                         88                         107                      312* 
                                     (38%)                     (28%)                    (34%)                 (100%) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
* Although a total of 313 rehearsals were recorded, on one occasion in the event-based  
 
condition concentration rating was omitted, hence, 312 cases. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Mean proportion of recorded rehearsals per hour as a function of prospective 
memory response group (HIT vs. LATE) and day (Monday vs. Tuesday vs. Wednesday 
vs. Thursday vs. Friday vs. Saturday vs. Sunday) in Study 1. 
Figure 2. Mean proportion of recorded rehearsals per hour as a function of age group 
(young vs. old) and day (Monday vs. Tuesday vs. Wednesday vs. Thursday vs. Friday vs. 
Saturday vs. Sunday) in Study 2. 
Figure 3. Mean number of recorded rehearsals as a function of condition (time- vs. event-
based task) and day (Day 1 vs. Day 2 vs. Day 3 vs. Day 4 vs. Day 5 vs. Day 6 vs. Day 7) 
in Study 3. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
 
 
